Union Safety

Safety Coordinator Dennis Barker

When OSHA visits the Plant the reaction from management is immediate and with respect. I wish I could say the same thing when the Union Safety Committee (USC) or our members raises safety issues and concerns. Every time OSHA shows up for an inspection management always points out how disappointed they are that the issue could not be resolved in house without calling in a third party. The examples below will show how quickly management responds to OSHA compared to how they respond when the USC raised the same issues;

 

  1. Flash Back Arrestors-The USC found that the Plantwide SWP for flash back arrestors was exempting flash back protection on high volume torches in violation of the OSHA standards. We asked that the SWP be changed to comply with OSHA Standards and that all high volume torches be provided with flash back protection. After four months of head nodding from management agreeing with us on the issue their only answer was that they were working on a draft to change one sentence in the SWP. After a complaint was filed and the OSHA officer showed up management immediately assigned maintenance crews over the following two shifts to install flash back protection on all the torches they could find. The torches they couldn't provide protection on were taken out of service before the Compliance Officer's visit. Two weeks later the SWP in question was changed to comply with the law.

  2. GGG Cleaner Basement-The USC requested for several months that the foaming over of the Sodium Hydroxide tanks be controlled in the GGG Cleaner Basement and that the chemical mixture on the basement floor and on the outside of the tanks be cleaned up. When the OSHA officer showed up they sent him back to Fairview Heights for a C/O monitor while he was gone laborers were assigned in the basement to clean up what they could before he returned. After the inspection the basement floor and tanks were completely cleaned the walls painted white and new bright lights was installed. Now the basement does not look like a dark dungeon.

  3. Pot Haulers and Pot Hauler Roads- The USC asked management to address several complaints we received on the condition of the Pot Haulers and the Pot Hauler roads and area on top of the Hill where the pots are dumped. There were a couple of cursory attempts by Stein management to correct the roads and Hill area but the poor conditions quickly returned. After the OSHA Officer scheduled a visit to the Hill Area Stein put a road grader working the area on a 12-8 turn the night before the visit and had the Hill looking like a highway. We were told a road grader has never been scheduled to work the Hill on a turn before.

  4. Security Guard Shack Ergonomic Study-The USC requested an ergonomic study in November 2006 of the Guard Shacks stations and the chairs being provided the Guards. The study was completed in January 2007 and the Company did not provide the Union a copy of the study. The USC began asking for the study in April 2007 the Company's response each month was the study was complete but they never provided the Union a copy of it. After the OSHA Officer asked for a copy the company reportedly tore Veeder Health Center up looking for a copy that day. Two weeks later the Union received a copy of the study dated January 7, 2007.


When the USC and our members see Management's immediate actions and reactions when an OSHA Compliance Officer shows up, it clearly demonstrates why a third party has to be called in occasionally to get some results.

On each of the OSHA complaints I listed above the agency asked me what does the Union want out of this complaint? Each time my response to OSHA was "I want management to take our Union Safety Committee’s issues and concerns as serious as they take you and the OSHA agency after an inspection ."

 

Of course management is going to claim that they always take the USC safety concerns seriously. But if they really took the Union and our members concerns serious then—Why wasn't two crews immediately assigned to correct flash back hazards when we raised the issue? Why wasn't the GGG Basement cleaned, painted and re-lamped when we requested it? Why wasn't the Hill prepared like a highway and the road grader assigned on a 12-8 turn after we raised the Pot Hauler road conditions? And why did it take management 14 months to provide an ergonomic study that we requested in 2006 that they promptly provided to OSHA?

Does Management take the Union Safety Committee as seriously as the OSHA agency [NO] but we're getting there!!

  

Working without proper Personal Protective Equipment isn’t smart…

DON’T GET CAUGHT WITHOUT IT!

USS Management is always watching…

Don’t Take Chances!

Safety Is No Accident!

Your Union Safety Committee Is Here for You:

_________________________________________________________

SAFETY CONTACTS

MEMBER.................ZONE..................NUMBER

Dennis Barker..........Chairman.............451-4086
Jack Illies...................Zone 16..............451-4576
Mike Rogers......Zone 30..............451-3080
Don Ogle....................Zone 67..............451-3637
Mike Hargrave..........Unit 9325............451-3127
Tom Howard.............Unit 4063............N/A
Russell Knight.........Local 68.............451-3706

US Steel’s Safety Conversations

By Tom Conway, Mike Wright and Steve Massengill

 

            US Steel has a new safety program they call “Safety Conversations.” They are training supervisors to talk to employees about safety in a formal, structured way. Imagine a company having to train its bosses on how to hold a decent conversation! Every supervisor will be expected to spend a certain number of hours on the safety conversations every week.

            Normally, it would be a good thing for supervisors to talk about safety. It would be even better if they sought out the views of union members on what is needed to make the plant safer and healthier. But that’s not what this program is about.  Instead, supervisors are supposed to concentrate on how you do your job and correct any “unsafe acts” they uncover.

            The entire program was designed by DuPont, and DuPont is doing the training for managers. DuPont’s philosophy is that 96% of all accidents are caused by unsafe acts, and only 4% by unsafe conditions. That’s actually stated in DuPont’s management training manuals for the program. 

            The USW knows DuPont. We’ve done inspections in DuPont facilities, and in other companies that have bought DuPont programs. Some were fatality investigations. Safety at those sites was poor. DuPont has also been cited by OSHA for falsifying injury records and by EPA for numerous environmental violations. They are a viciously anti-union company, and have been guilty of numerous violations of federal labor law.

            The USW offered to work with USS to design and implement a real safety program, one that focuses on finding and fixing hazards in the plant. USS declined and contracted out their own safety program to DuPont instead. You have to wonder why.

            So what should you do when a supervisor wants to have a “safety conversation?” It’s a mistake to refuse. The company might consider that to be insubordination. Instead, you should tell them what you really think about safety at USS. Tell them how nobody wants to report accidents or hazards for fear of discipline. Tell them that their safety program has become little more than a witch hunt. Tell them how forced overtime is making people work when they are fatigued. Tell them how short-staffing is creating safety problems. Tell them that the record level of 5-day notices and discipline isn’t working. Tell them about all the unsafe things contractors do. Tell them about insufficient training, bad SJP’s, excessive dust in the air, lousy housekeeping, noise, heat and all the other hazards in the plant.

            When we discussed this program with USS, we were able to extract one concession. USS has guaranteed that safety conversations will not be used for discipline. We have that in writing, and in a way we can use in arbitration. The local union has a copy, if you’d like to see the letter. But the guarantee is only good for the formal safety conversations. So when a supervisor wants to talk about safety, first ask him or her if it is part of the safety conversation program.

            And when you talk to them, tell them one more thing. Tell them how much you’d like to see a real safety program. One that doesn’t look for ways to blame workers. One that isn’t based on fear. One that focuses on finding and fixing hazards instead of being obsessed with workers’ behavior. One that respects your knowledge and commitment to safety and your job. And most of all, one where the union and the company work together to make USS the safest possible place to work.

 

Tom Conway is a USW Vice President and chairs the union’s negotiating committee with USS. Mike Wright is the USW’s Director of Health, Safety and Environment. Steve Massengill is the USW’s Corporate-Level Safety Coordinator for USS.

 

Adequate Manpower

Should be a Core

Value

By Zone 67 Safety Chair Don Ogle

   

During the recent activities involving safety, the General Manager tour with Dave Rintoul, the Safety Stand down and the walkabouts of the Managers and ASRs, the topics of overtime, manpower and schedules surfaced repeatedly. The G.M. tour and the walkabouts were refreshingly positive and the hope is that they will aid in making GCW a safer place to work. But, let’s take a look at the three topics mentioned as a central issue; manpower.

           Ask yourself, can you believe a supervisor who, when speaking as an agent of USS states that your safety is No. 1 and that safety is a core value and that your safety is his highest priority while at the same time schedules you three different shifts in a week that denies you the opportunity to get the proper rest so that you can safely perform at your peak effectiveness? Can you trust a supervisor that doesn’t push for more people to be scheduled in his domain but instead relies on overtime every week to get the work done? Or the supervisor that depends on forced overtime to cover turns? Again, the answer is a resounding no; he does not put your safety first. You can trust that he cares about any incident or injury that occurs in his domain negatively affects his pay “metrics”. Within the word supervisor above, one can insert the terms foreman, manager or director as the circumstances fit.

There are routine maintenance jobs in the Hot Strip that are not done due to not having a fire watch available. This entails both activities, safetyman during a hot work job, and fire watch following such job. Not enough laborers on the schedule to supply these primary safety functions. The point is not that the work isn’t being done although that is a concern. The interest here is that I can see eventually someone will start pushing for the work to be done without the safety functions filled. I know that we can all count on our folks not to succumb to that kind of pressure if or when it presents itself.

That scenario makes me wonder if other safety functions, such as Aerial Lift safetyman, are going to be subjected to a lack of manpower as well. They won’t be if we all stick to our guns and continue to demand our safety. Management will steadfastly state that “no way” would that happen, but we have seen cracks in that veneer. It has happened with one supervisor who has made attempts to undo the long-standing practice of no one cleaning the 80” Oil Basement alone.

           But that instance leads belief that no ones safety is solid. It helps prove my point. And I am sure other supervisors prove that point many times on the back turns or when production is at risk or when manpower is inadequate. I ask that all hourly folks stand fast and not let this happen. I know of several examples of hourly workers, and when I know of these I announce them at the Union Meetings during my reports, who stood on their rights and were successful in not succumbing to working unsafe or against the rules. Keep it up.

The more you assert yourself the more we prove that we do in fact want and deserve a safe place to work. The more you have to assert yourself the more it proves that safety is not a core USS value. It is an empty slogan. And as long as there is a shortage of manpower, you will be tested in your resolve to assert your rights to a safe work place.

 

British Petroleum Refinery Blast Due to Lack of Safety

By Dennis Barker

 

The Chemical Safety Board Blasts BP and OSHA in Final Texas City Accident Report…

On March 20th   the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) presented their final accident report at a public meeting on the explosion that occurred at the Texas City BP Refinery that killed 15 workers and injured over 170. I have been following this investigation very closely since BP’s the first reaction was to blame the workers by firing three USW members blaming them for the incident.  As you can see below the real root causes of the accident was management’s safety process (or lack of) that set the stage for the disaster. The CSB investigation found organizational and safety deficiencies at all levels of the BP Corporation, which led to the explosion.

Below are the key findings from the CSB investigation report;

  • Safety was Harmed by Cost-Cutting, Production Pressures and Investment Failures…..

The CSB report found that aggressive cost-cutting programs created in the 1990s by Amoco and then continued under BP left the Texas City refinery vulnerable to a catastrophe. Cost cutting prevented refinery officials from replacing the blowdown drum with a flare system, which probably would have prevented the accident.   

  • Blast Modeling Showed the Vulnerability of Temporary Trailers……

All 15 of the fatalities occurred in or near temporary contractor trailers that were located as close as 121 feet from a blowdown drum that vented the flammable liquid and vapor directly to the atmosphere.

  • Human Factors Analysis: Fatigue and Errors More Likely…..

The CSB team concluded that the unit operators were likely fatigued when the startup occurred.  Prior to the explosion operators had been working 12-hour shifts for 29 or more consecutive days.  Fatigue has been recognized as a cause of major accidents in the transportation sector. Fatigue prevention regulations have been developed for aviation, railroads and other transportation sectors, but there are no fatigue prevention regulations for General Industry.

The investigative team also pointed to significant manpower reductions that occurred in operations and lack of training at the refinery.  BP cut in half the number of control board operators in the accident area, from two to one. In 2003 the sole remaining operator was given additional duties to operate a third processing unit. A 2003 BP hazard review recommended that a second operator be scheduled during startups, but BP never implemented this. 

The CSB report recommends that the American Petroleum Institute (API) and the USW work together to develop a new consensus standard for fatigue prevention in the oil and chemical industry.

  • Dysfunctional Safety Culture Existed at All Levels of BP

Over a thirty-year period 23 workers have been killed at the Texas City facility - not counting the 15 workers killed in March 2005.  Many of the safety issues that led to the March 2005 accident had been previously identified in internal safety audits, reports, and investigations. The findings show that both BP executives and Texas City managers became aware of serious process safety problems but failed to take corrective actions.

            The investigation found BP managers and executives attempted to make improvements from 2002 to 2005 that were largely focused on behavior safety - such as slips, trips, falls, and vehicle accidents - rather than on improving the process safety performance. During the same period BP executives made spending cuts without assessing the safety impact of those decisions. The CSB report calls on API and the USW to develop a new consensus standard defining performance indicators for process safety. 

  • The CSB found that OSHA was Lax in Petrochemical Inspections and Enforcement….

Although the refinery had experienced numerous fatal incidents from 1985 to 2005, the investigation found that OSHA’s last planned inspection at the Texas City Refinery occurred in 1998. All other OSHA inspections of the Texas City Refinery were unplanned in response to accidents, complaints, or referrals.

OSHA’s fines during the twenty years, preceding the March 2005 disaster, a period when 10 fatalities occurred at the refinery - totaled $270,255 proposed fines which were reduced after negotiations to $77,860. 

Following the March 2005 explosion, OSHA issued the largest penalty in its history over $21 million for more than 300 egregious and willful violations.

The CSB Chairman Merritt said “Rules already on the books would likely have prevented the tragedy in Texas City, But if a company is not following those rules, year-in and year-out, it is ultimately the responsibility of the federal government to enforce good safety practices before more lives are lost

USW President Leo W. Gerard released the following statement after the release of the CSB report;

            “We welcome this opportunity to make improvements and changes in the health and safety culture at refineries and petrochemical plants,” These new standards will have to be crafted so they make a real difference and are not simply watered-down versions of change.”

OSHA Visits Granite City Steel on Three Formal Complaints….

There are currently three open active OSHA investigations on three formal complaints that have recently been filed.

  1. The failure to provide flashback protection on cutting torches and a Plantwide Safe Work Practice (SWP) that was in violation of an OSHA Standard. The OSHA Standard 1910.253 requires flashback protection on oxygen/fuel gas systems. The Union Safety asked USS the change the one improper sentence in the SWP in the September 2006 Safety First meeting which would have resulted in the proper equipment being installed on the torches. For four months, until the OSHA compliance officer showed up, we were told the Safety Department was working on a draft of one sentence in the SWP!! During the inspection the OSHA compliance officer found the hazard, an unprotected torch, and cited the Company with a ‘Serious’ violation and a proposed $1,500 fine. OSHA also is requesting that USS change the Plantwide SWP to comply with the Standard.

2.      The failure to provide positive protection from overhead crane movement for the front-end loader operators when they clean out the BOF Rubble Pits. The only protection they currently have is a red light in the area alerting the Cranemen that there is loader movement in the building. The OSHA investigation is on going with this complaint.

  1. USS failed to provide medical records, at no cost, (Chest X-Rays) to one of our members. Under the OSHAct medical records are provided at no cost to the employee when requested. OSHA however treats X-Rays as special records since they are not easily copied. OSHA said X-Rays must be made available to employees for their Doctor to review or if you request a copy of your X-Rays the cost of copying them can be passed on to you after the question of cost is fully discussed with the requesting person. The Company failed to discus the cost of copying the X-Rays with our member and simply passed on the bill they received. Also our Contract language should resolve this issue since Article 3.F.5 clearly states; “Upon written request by the Employee, the Company will provide the Employee with a copy of the Employee’s medical records at no cost to the Employee. 

The contract does not treat X-Rays as special records, as OSHA does, the BLA clearly states medical records, which X-Rays are considered as medical records will be provided to employees at no cost.

            I will keep the membership informed on the status and resolution of these complaints as they proceed through the OSHA agency’s process.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

IMPORTANT SAFETY WEB SITES:

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (OSHA)

UNITED STEELWORKERS HEALTH AND SAFETY DEPT.

US ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

AFL-CIO HEALTH & SAFETY DEPT.

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